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Politicians like to draw analogies between those 
who sought to placate Germany's Adolf Hitler in the 1930s and Iraq's Saddam Hussein in the early 
2000s, and those who seem to give in to Iran’s President Ahmadinejad. 
The November 2011 report presented by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), Yukia Amano, left little doubt about the true nature of the Iranian nuclear program. 
Moreover, another report released by the IAEA in Mid-August indicated that during the summer 
Iran had doubled the number of uranium enrichment centrifuges. These reports have rekindled the 
debate on the policy adopted by the West and Israel towards Iran’s nuclear program. As the capacity 
of Iran to develop a nuclear bomb increases and has reached, it is believed in some quarters, the 
point of no return, policymakers and analysts are pondering military alternatives for stopping Iran’s 
quest to allegedly acquire the status of a nuclear state. Trying to appease the Iranian regime, some 
argue, will not achieve the desired goal, and there is plenty of historical evidence to support such a 
view, they add. Apocalyptic scenarios about what will happen when Iran is in possession of the 
bomb are drawn.  
But as the smell of war over Iran’s uranium enrichment program is spreading throughout the Persian 
Gulf, the rhetoric of the dangers of appeasement has returned. A Google search of the word returns 
no less than 3,560,000 hits. A cursory read, however, indicates that this is a unilaterally 
misunderstood and overused analogy. 
For many illustrious western politicians, let alone historians, the legacy of appeasement remains one 
of the most unshakable of the so-called “lessons” of history: You cannot negotiate with a dictator. It 
is clear that pre-emptive resistance against Nazi Germany would have prevented the Second World 
War, they say. Appeasement, pacification, negotiation, noble as those tactics are, they do not work – 
or so history tells us. Therefore, reference to the democracies’ failed, if valiant, efforts in the 1930s 
fuels a powerful argument for war against Iran, or at least targeted air strikes. In sum, for hardliners, 
war is hell, but appeasement is worse. 
The decades since the Second World War are littered, on both sides of the Atlantic, with an 
intimidating number of instances in which politicians have justified their decisions with reference to 
appeasement and diplomatic negotiations. 
Given the current international situation, American examples come most easily to mind. In 1950, 
President Harry Truman argued that the North Korean attack against South Korea represented “the 
same kind of challenge Hitler flaunted in the face of the rest of the world when he crossed the 
borders of Austria and Czechoslovakia.” Defending his rationale for pursuing the Vietnam War, 
President Lyndon Johnson said, “We learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the 
appetite of aggression.” And again, in the war-drumming prior to the first Gulf War of 1990 to 1991, 
President George H.W. Bush declared: “Appeasement does not work. As was seen in the 1930s, we 
see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.” 
President George W. Bush used the same appeasement analogy when addressing the United Nations 
on Sept. 12, 2002: “Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped [in 1991], he would 
have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped.” National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice appeared on NBC’s Meet the Press on February 16, 2003 and 
said: “We need to remind everybody that tyrants don’t respond to any kind of appeasement… 
Tyrants respond to toughness. And that was true in the 1930s and 1940s when we failed to respond 
to tyranny, and it is true today.” 
The recourse to the appeasement analogy retains a respectable parentage in Britain, as well as in 
continental Europe. Initially a synonym for what diplomacy is all about, the term was used after the 
First World War in the 1920s to designate the strategy of pacifying Germany and achieving a 
broader European settlement. 
But the experience of the later 1930s changed that perception. By the time of the Suez Crisis in 
1956, a clear line of argument emerged. The “lesson of appeasement,” wrote then-Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden, was that the policy only fed the appetite of the aggressor. It is important to reduce 
the stature of a dictator at an early stage.” When she was writing in defense of the Falkland Islands 
War of 1982, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that “aggressors should never succeed and 
that international law should prevail.” 
These sentiments surfaced again after September 11, 2001. A few days later, Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw warned members of the House of Commons “to draw lessons from the experience of the 
1930s. We all know the consequences of what followed.” Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted, “All 
our history, especially British history, points to the lesson that if international demands are not 
backed up with force, the result is greater insecurity.” 
For decision-makers, the lessons of the 1930s appear self-evident. At first, historians agreed. After 
1945, Winston Churchill argued that the Second World War was “the Unnecessary War.” Historians 
generally saw Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his team as “guilty men” – guilty of myopia 
toward Hitler’s ambitions and of not responding earlier to his threats. They wrote of how the 
Chamberlain cabinet underestimated the poison of Nazism, refused to educate the public about 
Hitler’s expansionist plans, and failed to rearm adequately, thus contributing to the outbreak of the 
war. 
In the 1960s, new documents led to a period of revisionist debate. Many historians began to contend 
that prewar British policy was determined by limitations due to a divided public opinion, the effects 
of the Great Depression, and extensive imperial obligations. Appeasement was, in fact, the logical 
response. By 1989, John Charmley, a controversial British historian, was trumpeting that 
Chamberlain’s reputation stood at an all-time high. 
Why does there remain such a chasm between decision-makers, convinced that appeasement is 
doomed to failure, and historians, who seem to abhor consensus? Is it because of ignorance – that 
politicians have little time to read history and so use it badly? Or do historians only talk to each 
other, engaging in a dialogue without end? The value of ivory-tower debate, ideally, should be to 
enlighten current political action. If so, there needs to be a bridge between what historians write and 
what politicians do. 
By contrast, no such reluctance can be seen in the area of public decision-making, where the 
politicians always believe that history teaches lessons, especially convenient ones. One reason is that 
the appeasement analogy is a knockout argument. It provides convenient shorthand to rationalize 
decisions which have already been taken and enables public opinion to be quickly mobilized. Its 
brilliance is that the familiarity of the analogy supersedes its questionable validity. 
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